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1 INTRODUCTION
We define the model of an abstract economy with private information and
a countable set of actions. The preference correspondences need not to be
represented by utility functions. The equilibrium concept is an extension of
the deterministic equilibrium. We present the H. Yu and Z. Zhang’s model
in [18], in which the agents maximize their expected utilities. Our model is
a generalization of H. Yu and Z. Zhang’s one.
A purpose in this paper is to prove the existence of equilibrium for
an abstract economy with private information and a countable set of ac-
tions. The assumptions on correspondences refer to upper semicontinuity
and measurability.
The existence of pure strategy equilibrium for a game with finitely many
players, finite action space and diffuse and independent private information
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was first proved by Radner and Rosenthal [15]. This result was extended by
Khan and Sun [10] to the case of a finite game with diffuse and indepen-
dent private information and with countable compact metric spaces as their
action spaces. These authores have shown in [8] that Radner and Rosen-
thal’s result can not be extended to a general action space. We quote the
papers of M.A. Khan, K. Rath, Y. Sun [7], [8], [9] and M.A. Khan, Y. Sun
[11], [12], concerning this subject of research. In [19], H. Yu and Z. Zhang
showed the existence of pure strategy equilibrium for games with countable
complete metric spaces and worked with compact-valued correspondences.
They relied on the Bolloba´s and Varopulos’s extension [2] of the marriage
lemma to construct a theory of the distribution of a correspondence from
an atomless probability space to a countable complete metric space. They
also studied the case of the game with a continuum of players.
The classical model of Nash [14] was generalized by many authors. Mod-
els were proposed in his pioneering works by Debreu [3] or later by A. Borglin
and H. Keiding [2], Shafer and Sonnenschein [16], Yannelis and Prahbakar
[18]. Yannelis and Prahbakar developed new tehniques of work for showing
the existence of equilibrium. That is the reason for what we defined a new
model that can be integrated in this direction of development of the game
theory. We use the fixed point method of finding the equilibrium, precisely
we use Ky Fan fixed point theorem for upper semicontinuous correspon-
dences.
The paper is organised as follows: In section 2, some notation and termi-
nological convention are given. In section 3, H. Yu and Z. Zhang’s expected
utility model with a finite number of agents and private information and
their main result in [19] are presented. Section 4 introduces our model, that
is, an abstract economy with private information and a countable space
of actions. Section 5 contains existence results for upper semicontinuous
correspondences.
2 PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATION
Throughout this paper, we shall use the following notations and definitions:
Let A be a subset of a topological space X .
1. F (A) denotes the family of all non-empty finite subsets of A.
2. 2A denotes the family of all subsets of A.
3. cl A denotes the closure of A in X .
4. If A is a subset of a vector space, coA denotes the convex hull of A.
5. If F , G : X → 2Y are correspondences, then coG, cl G, G∩F : X → 2Y
are correspondences defined by (coG)(x) =coG(x), (clG)(x) =clG(x)
and (G ∩ F )(x) = G(x) ∩ F (x) for each x ∈ X , respectively.
Definition 1. Each correspondence F : X → 2Y has two natural in-
verses:
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1. the upper inverse Fu (also called the strong inverse) of a subset A of Y
is defined by Fu(A) = {x ∈ A : F (x) ⊂ A} .
2. the lower inverse F l (also called the weak inverse) of a subset A of Y is
defined by F l(A) = {x ∈ A : F (x) ∩ A 6= ∅} .
Definition 2. Let X , Y be topological spaces and F : X → 2Y be a
correspondence.
1. F is said to be upper semicontinuous if for each x ∈ X and each open
set V in Y with F (x) ⊂ V , there exists an open neighborhood U of x in X
such that F (y) ⊂ V for each y ∈ U .
2. F is said to be lower semicontinuous (l.s.c) if for each x ∈ X and each
open set V in Y with F (x)∩ V 6= ∅, there exists an open neighbourhood U
of x in X such that F (y) ∩ V 6= ∅ for each y ∈ U .
Lemma 1 [20]. Let X and Y be two topological spaces and let A be a
closed (resp. open) subset of X. Suppose F1 : X → 2
Y , F2 : X → 2
Y are
lower semicontinuous (resp. upper semicontinuous) such that F2(x) ⊂ F1(x)
for all x ∈ A. Then the correspondence F : X → 2Y defined by
F (x ) =
{
F1(x), if x /∈ A,
F2(x), if x ∈ A
is also lower semicontinuous (resp. upper semicontinuous).
Definition 3 Let (T , T ) be a measurable space, Y a topological space
and F : T → 2Y a corespondence.
1. F is weakly measurable if F l(A) ∈ T for each open subset A of Y ;
2. F is measurable if F l(A) ∈ T for each closed subset A of Y.
Remark. Let (T , T ) be a measurable space, Y a countable set and F :
T → 2Y a corespondence. Then F is measurable if for each y ∈ Y, F−1(y) =
{t ∈ T : y ∈ F (t)} is T −measurable.
Lemma 2 [1]. For a correspondence F : T → 2Y from a measurable
space into a metrizable space we have the following:
1. If F is measurable, then it is also weakly measurable;
2. If F is compact valued and weakly measurable, it is measurable.
Definition 4 [19]. Let Y be a countable complete metric space, (T , T ,
λ) an atomless probability space and F : T → 2Y a measurable corespon-
dence. The function f : T → Y is said to be a selection of F if f(t) ∈ F (t) for
λ−almost t ∈ T. Denote DF =
{
λf−1 : f is a measurable selection of F
}
.
Lemma 3 [19]. Let Y be a countable complete metric space, (T , T ,
λ) an atomless probability space and F : T → 2Y a measurable corespon-
dence. Then DF is nonempty and convex in the space M(Y ) - the space of
probability measure on Y , equipped with the topology of weak convergence.
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Lemma 4 [19]. Let Y be a countable complete metric space, and (T ,
T , λ) be an atomless probability space and F : T → 2Y be a measurable
corespondence. If F is compact valued, then DF is compact in M(Y ).
Lemma 5 [19]. Let X be a metric space, (T , T , λ) be an atomless
probability space, Y be a countable complete metric space and F : T×X →
2Y a correspondence. Assume that for any fixed x inX , F (·, x) (also denoted
by Fx) is a compact-valued measurable correspondence, and for each fixed
t ∈ T, F (t, ·) is upper semicontinuous on X . Also, assume that there exists
a compact valued corespondence H : T ×X → 2Y such that F (t, x) ⊂ H(t)
for all t and x. Then DFx is upper semicontinuous on X.
Theorem 1 (Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski Selection Theorem)
[1]. A weakly measurable correspondence with nonempty closed values from
a measurable space into a Polish space admits a measurable selector.
3 A Nash Equilibrium Existence Theorem
We present Yu and Zhang’s model of a finite game with private information.
In this model it is assigned to each agent a private information related to his
action and payoff described by the random mappings τ i and χi, mappings
defined on (Ω,F) = (
∏
i∈I
(Zi, Xi),
∏
i∈I
(Zi,Xi)), where (Xi, Xi) and (Zi,Zi)
are measurable spaces. For a point ω = (z1, x1, ..., zn, xn) ∈ Ω, τ i and χi
are the coordinate projections
τ i(ω) = zi, χi(ω) = xi. Each player i in I first observes the realization,
say zi ∈ Zi, of the random element τ i(ω), then chooses his own action from
a nonempty compact subset Di(zi) of a countable complete metric space Ai,
with Di(·) measurable. The payoff of each player i is given by the the utility
function ui : A×Xi → R, where A =
∏
j∈I
Aj is the set of of all combinations
of all players’ moves. Let µ be a probability measure on Ω. It is assumed
the following uniform integrability condition (UI):
(UI) For every i ∈ I, there is a real-valued integrable function hi :Ω → R
such that µ−almost all ω ∈ Ω, | ui(a, χi(ω)) |≤ hi(ω) holds for all a ∈ A.
Definition 5 [19]. A finite game with private information is a family
Γ = (I, ((Zi,Zi), (Xi,Xi), (Ai, Di), ui)i∈I , µ).
For each i ∈ I, let meas(Zi, Di) be the set of measurable mappings f
from Zi to Ai such that f(zi) ∈ Di(zi) for each zi ∈ Zi. An element gi of
meas(Zi, Ai) is called a pure strategy for player i. A pure strategy profile g
is an n-vector function (g1, g2, ..., gn) that specifies a pure strategy for each
player.
Definition 6 [19]. For a pure strategy profile g = (g1, g2, ..., gn), the
expected payoff for player i is
Ui(g) =
∫
ω∈Ω
ui(g1(τ1(ω)), ..., gn(τn(ω)), χi(ω))µd(ω).
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Definition 7 [19]. A Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is defined as
a pure strategy profile (g∗
1
, g∗
2
, ..., g∗n) such that for each player i ∈ I
Ui(g
∗) ≥ Ui(gi, g∗−i) for all gi ∈Meas(Zi, Di).
The following theorem is the main result of Zhang in [19].
Theorem 2 Suppose that for every player i, the compact valued Di
corespondence is measurable, and
a) the distribution µτ−1i of τ i is an atomless measure;
b) the random elements {τ j : j 6= i} together with the random element
ξi ≡ (τ i, χi) form a mutually independent set;
c) for any fixed xi ∈ Xi, ui(·, xi) is a continuous function on A; for any
fixed a ∈ A, ui(a, ·) is a measurable function on (Xi,Xi);
d) the uniform integrability condition (UI) holds.
Then the game Γ has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
4 The Model of an abstract economy with private information
In this section we define a model of abstract economy with private informa-
tion and a countable set of actions. We also prove the existence of equilib-
rium of abstract economies.
Let I be a nonempty and finite set (the set of agents). For each i ∈ I, the
space of actions, Ai is a countable complete metric space and (Zi,Zi) is mea-
surable space. Let (Ω,F) be the product measurable space, (
∏
i∈I
Zi,
∏
i∈I
Zi),
and µ a probability measure on (Ω,F). For a point ω = (z1, ..., zn) ∈ Ω,
define the coordinate projections
τ i(ω) = zi.
The random mapping τ i(ω) is interpreted as player i’s private informa-
tion related to his action.
For each i ∈ I, we also denote by meas(Zi, Ai) the set of measurable map-
pings f from Zi to Ai. An element gi of meas(Zi, Ai) is called a pure strategy
for player i. A pure strategy profile g is an n-vector function (g1, g2, ..., gn)
that specifies a pure strategy for each player.
We suppose that there exists a correspondence Di : Zi → 2
Ai such that
each agent i can choose an action from Di(zi) ⊂ Ai for each zi ∈ Zi.
Let DDi be the set
{
(µτ−1i )g
−1
i : gi is a measurable selection of Di
}
.
For each i ∈ I, let the constraint correspondence be αi : Zi×
∏
i∈I
DDi →
2Ai , such that αi(zi, (µτ
−1
1
)g−1
1
, (µτ−1
2
)g−1
2
, ..., (µτ−1n )g
−1
n ) ⊂ Ai and the
preference correspondence is Pi : Zi×
∏
i∈I
DDi → 2
Ai , such that Pi(zi, (µτ
−1
1
)g−1
1
,
(µτ−1
2
)g−1
2
, ..., (µτ−1n )g
−1
n ) ⊂ Ai.
Definition 8. An abstract economy (or a generalized game) with private
information and a countable space of actions is defined as Γ = (I, ((Zi,Zi),
(Ai, αi, Pi))i∈I , µ).
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Definition 9. An equilibrium for Γ is defined as a strategy profile
(g∗
1
, g∗
2
, ..., g∗n) ∈
∏
i∈I
Meas(Zi, Di) such that for each i ∈ I :
1) g∗i (zi) ∈ αi(zi, (µτ
−1
1
)(g∗
1
)−1, (µτ−1
2
)(g∗
2
)−1, ..., (µτ−1n )(g
∗
n)
−1)
for each zi ∈ Zi;
2) αi(zi, (µτ
−1
1
)(g∗
1
)−1, (µτ−1
2
)(g∗
2
)−1, ..., (µτ−1n )(g
∗
n)
−1)∩
Pi(zi, (µτ
−1
1
)(g∗
1
)−1, (µτ−1
2
)(g∗
2
)−1, ..., (µτ−1n )(g
∗
n)
−1) = φ for each zi ∈
Zi.
.
5 Existence of equilibrium for abstract economies with private
information
We state some new equilibrium existence theorems for abstract economies.
Theorem 3 is an existence theorem of equilibrium for an abstract econ-
omy with upper semicontinuous correspondences αi and Pi.
Theorem 3. Let Γ = (I, ((Zi,Zi), (Ai, αi, Pi))i∈I , µ) be an abstract
economy with private information and a countable space of action, where
I is a finite index set such that for each i ∈ I :
a) Ai is a countable complete metric space and (Zi,Zi) is a measurable
space; (Ω,F ) is the product measurable space (
∏
i∈I
(Zi,Zi)) and µ an atomless
probability measure on (Ω,F );
b) the correspondence Di : Zi → 2Ai is measurable with compact values;
c) the correspondence αi : Zi ×
∏
i∈I
DDi → 2
Ai is measurable with re-
spect to zi and, for all zi ∈ Zi, αi(zi, ·, ·, ..., ·) is upper semicontinuous with
nonempty, compact values;
d) the correspondence Pi : Zi ×
∏
i∈I
DDi → 2
Ai is measurable with re-
spect to zi and, for all zi ∈ Zi, Pi(zi, ·, ·, ..., ·) is upper semicontinuous with
nonempty, compact values;
e) for each zi ∈ Zi and each (g1, g2, ..., gn) ∈
∏
i∈I
Meas(Zi, Ai),
gi(zi) 6∈ Pi(zi, (µτ
−1
1
)g−1
1
, (µτ−1
2
)g−1
2
, ..., (µτ−1n )g
−1
n );
f) the set Ui :={
(zi, λ1, λ2, ..., λn) ∈ Zi ×
∏
i∈I
DDi : (αi ∩ Pi)(zi, λ1, λ2, ..., λn) = ∅
}
is open
for each zi ∈ Zi.
Then there exists (g∗
1
, g∗
2
, ..., g∗n) ∈
∏
i∈I
Meas(Zi, Ai) an equilibrium for Γ.
Proof. By Lemma 3, DDi is nonempty and convex. By Lemma 4, DDi
is compact. For each i ∈ I the set
Ui :=
{
(zi, λ1, λ2, ..., λn) ∈ Zi ×
∏
i∈I
DDi : (αi ∩ Pi)(zi, λ1, λ2, ..., λn) = ∅
}
is open
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and we define Fi : Zi ×
∏
i∈I
DDi → 2
Ai by
Fi(zi, λ1, λ2, ..., λn) =
{
(αi ∩ Pi)(zi, λ1, λ2, ..., λn) if (zi, λ1, λ2, ..., λn) 6∈ Ui,
αi(zi, λ1, λ2, ..., λn) if (zi, λ1, λ2, ..., λn) ∈ Ui.
Then the correspondence Fi has nonempty, compact values and is mea-
surable with respect to zi and upper semicontinuous with respect to (λ1, λ2, ..., λn) ∈∏
i∈I
DDi .
We denote DFi(λ1, λ2, ..., λn) =
=
{
(µτ−1i )g
−1
i : gi is a measurable selection of Fi(·, λ1, λ2, ..., λn)
}
. Then:
i) DFi(λ1, λ2, ..., λn) is nonempty because there exists a measurable se-
lection from the correspondence Fi by Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardewski Selection
Theorem.
ii) DFi(λ1, λ2, ..., λn) is convex and compact by Lemma 3 and Lemma
4.
We define Φ :
∏
i∈I
DDi → 2
∏
i∈I
DDi
, Φ(λ1, λ2, ..., λn) =
∏
i∈I
DFi(λ1, λ2, ...
, λn).
The set
∏
i∈I
DDi is nonempty, compact and convex. By Lemma 5 the
correspondence DFi is upper semicontinuous. Then the correspondence Φ
is upper semicontinuous and has nonempty compact and convex values.
By Ky Fan fixed point Theorem, we know that there exists a fixed point
(λ∗
1
, λ∗
2
, ..., λ∗n) ∈ Φ(λ
∗
1
, λ∗
2
, ..., λ∗n). In particular, for each player i, λ
∗
i ∈
DFi(λ
∗
1
, λ∗
2
, ..., λ∗n). Therefore, for each player i, there exists g
∗
i ∈Meas(Zi, Ai)
such that g∗i is a selection of Fi(·, λ
∗
1
, λ∗
2
, ..., λ∗n) and (µτ
−1
i )(g
∗
i )
−1 = λ∗i .
We prove that (g∗
1
, g∗
2
, ..., g∗n) is an equilibrium for Γ. For each i ∈ I,
because g∗i is a selection of Fi(·, λ
∗
1
, λ∗
2
, ..., λ∗n), it follows that g
∗
i (zi) ∈ (αi ∩
Pi)(zi, λ
∗
1
, λ∗
2
, ..., λ∗n) if (zi, λ
∗
1
, λ∗
2
, ..., λ∗n) 6∈ Ui or g
∗
i (zi) ∈ α
′
i(zi, λ
∗
1
, λ∗
2
, ..., λ∗n)
if (zi, λ
∗
1
, λ∗
2
, ..., λ∗n) ∈ Ui.
By the assumption d) it follows that g∗i (zi) 6∈ Pi(zi, λ
∗
1
, λ∗
2
, ..., λ∗n) for
each zi ∈ Zi. Then g∗i (zi) ∈ αi(zi, λ
∗
1
, λ∗
2
, ..., λ∗n) and (zi, λ
∗
1
, λ∗
2
, ..., λ∗n) ∈ Ui.
This is equivalent with the fact that g∗i (zi) ∈ αi(zi, (µτ
−1
1
)(g∗
1
)−1, (µτ−1
2
)(g∗
2
)−1, ...,
(µτ−1n )(g
∗
n)
−1) and (αi∩Pi)(zi, (µτ
−1
1
)(g∗
1
)−1, (µτ−1
2
)(g∗
2
)−1, ..., (µτ−1n )(g
∗
n)
−1) =
∅ for each zi ∈ Zi. Consequently, (g∗1 , g
∗
2
, ..., g∗n) is an equilibrium for Γ.
Theorem 4. Let Γ = (I, ((Zi,Zi), (Ai, αi, Pi))i∈I , µ). be an abstract
economy with private information and a countable space of action, where I
is a finite index set such that for each i ∈ I,
a) Ai is a countable complete metric space and (Zi, Zi) is a measurable
space; (Ω,F) is the product measurable space
∏
i∈I
(Zi,Zi) and µ an atomless
probability measure on (Ω,F);
b) the correspondence Di : Zi → 2Ai is measurable with compact values;
let DDi be the set{
(µτ−1i )g
−1
i : gi is a measurable selection of Di
}
;
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c) the correspondence αi : Zi ×
∏
i∈I
DDi → 2
Ai is measurable with re-
spect to zi and, for all zi ∈ Zi, αi(zi, ·, ·, ..., ·) is upper semicontinuous with
nonempty, compact values;
d) there exists a selector Gi : Zi ×
∏
i∈I
DDi → 2
Ai for (αi ∩ Pi) :
Zi ×
∏
i∈I
DDi → 2
Ai such that Gi(zi, (µτ
−1
1
)g−1
1
, (µτ−1
2
)g−1
2
, ..., (µτ−1n )g
−1
n )
is measurable with respect to zi and, for all zi ∈ Zi, Gi(zi, ·, ·, ..., ·) is upper
semicontinuous with nonempty, compact values;
e) for each zi ∈ Zi and each (g1, g2, ..., gn) ∈
∏
i∈I
Meas(Zi, Ai),
gi(zi) 6∈ Gi(zi, (µτ
−1
1
)g−1
1
, (µτ−1
2
)g−1
2
, ..., (µτ−1n )g
−1
n );
f) the set
Ui :=
{
(zi, λ1, λ2, ..., λn) ∈ Zi ×
∏
i∈I
DDi : (αi ∩ Pi)(zi, λ1, λ2, ..., λn) = ∅
}
is open for each zi ∈ Zi.
Then there exists (g∗
1
, g∗
2
, ..., g∗n) ∈
∏
i∈I
Meas(Zi, Ai) an equilibrium for Γ.
Proof. By Lemma 3, DDi is nonempty and convex. By Lemma 4, DDi is
compact. For each i ∈ I the set
Ui :=
{
(zi, λ1, λ2, ..., λn) ∈ Zi ×
∏
i∈I
DDi : (αi ∩ Pi)(zi, λ1, λ2, ..., λn) = ∅
}
is open
and we define Fi : Zi ×
∏
i∈I
DDi → 2
Ai by
Fi(zi, λ1, λ2, ..., λn) =
{
Gi(zi, λ1, λ2, ..., λn) if (zi, λ1, λ2, ..., λn) 6∈ Ui,
αi(zi, λ1, λ2, ..., λn) if (zi, λ1, λ2, ..., λn) ∈ Ui.
Then the correspondence Fi has nonempty, compact values and is mea-
surable with respect to zi and upper semicontinuous with respect to (λ1, λ2, ..., λn) ∈∏
i∈I
DDi .
We denote DFi(λ1, λ2, ..., λn) =
=
{
(µτ−1i )g
−1
i : gi is a measurable selection of Fi(·, λ1, λ2, ..., λn)
}
. Then:
i) DFi(λ1, λ2, ..., λn) is nonempty because there exists a measurable se-
lection from the correspondence Fi by Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardewski Selection
Theorem.
ii) DFi(λ1, λ2, ..., λn) is convex and compact by Lemma 3 and Lemma
4.
We define Φ :
∏
i∈I
DDi → 2
∏
i∈I
DDi
, Φ(λ1, λ2, ..., λn) =
∏
i∈I
DFi(λ1, λ2, ..., λn).
The set
∏
i∈I
DDi is nonempty, compact convex. By Lemma 5 the corre-
spondenceDFi is upper semicontinuous. Then the correspondence Φ is upper
semicontinuous and has nonempty, compact and convex values. By Ky Fan
fixed point theorem, we know that there exists a fixed point (λ∗
1
, λ∗
2
, ..., λ∗n) ∈
Φ(λ∗
1
, λ∗
2
, ..., λ∗n). In particular, for each player i, λ
∗
i ∈ DFi(λ
∗
1
, λ∗
2
, ..., λ∗n).
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Therefore, for each player i, there exists g∗i ∈Meas(Zi, Ai) such that g
∗
i is a
selection of Fi(·, λ
∗
1
, λ∗
2
, ..., λ∗n) and (µτ
−1
i )(g
∗
i )
−1 = λ∗i .
We prove that (g∗
1
, g∗
2
, ..., g∗n) is an equilibrium for Γ. For each i ∈ I,
because g∗i is a selection of Fi(·, λ
∗
1
, λ∗
2
, ..., λ∗n), it follows that g
∗
i (zi) ∈ (αi ∩
Pi)(zi, λ
∗
1
, λ∗
2
, ..., λ∗n) if (zi, λ
∗
1
, λ∗
2
, ..., λ∗n) 6∈ Ui or g
∗
i (zi) ∈ αi(zi, λ
∗
1
, λ∗
2
, ..., λ∗n)
if (zi, λ
∗
1
, λ∗
2
, ..., λ∗n) ∈ Ui.
By the hypothesis d), it follows that g∗i (zi) 6∈ Gi(zi, λ
∗
1
, λ∗
2
, ..., λ∗n) for
each zi ∈ Zi. Then g∗i (zi) ∈ αi(zi, λ
∗
1
, λ∗
2
, ..., λ∗n) and (zi, λ
∗
1
, λ∗
2
, ..., λ∗n) ∈ Ui.
This is equivalent with the fact that g∗i (zi) ∈ αi(zi, (µτ
−1
1
)(g∗
1
)−1, (µτ−1
2
)(g∗
2
)−1, ...
, (µτ−1n )(g
∗
n)
−1) and (αi∩Pi)(zi, (µτ
−1
1
)(g∗
1
)−1, (µτ−1
2
)(g∗
2
)−1, ..., (µτ−1n )(g
∗
n)
−1) =
∅ for each zi ∈ Zi. Consequently, (g
∗
1
, g∗
2
, ..., g∗n) is an equilibrium for Γ.
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